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The three largest cities in colonial America remain at the core of three of 
America’s largest metropolitan areas today.  This paper asks how Boston 
has been able to survive despite repeated periods of crisis and decline. 
Boston has reinvented itself three times: in the early 19
th century as the 
provider of seafaring human capital for a far flung maritime trading and 
fishing empire, in the late 19
th century as a factory town built on 
immigrant labor and Brahmin capital, and finally in the late 20
th century as 
a center of the information economy.  In all three instances, human 
capital—admittedly of radically different forms—provided the secret to 
Boston’s rebirth.  The history of Boston suggests that a strong base of 
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I.  Introduction 
 
In 1980, Boston was a declining city in a middle-income metropolitan area in a cold state. 
Over the 60 year period between 1920 and 1980, Boston’s population had fallen from 
758,000 to 563,000, and Boston’s real estate values in 1980 were so low that three 
quarters of its homes were worth less than the bricks and mortar cost of construction 
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2001).  There was little reason at that date to suspect that Boston 
would be any more successful than Rochester or Pittsburgh or St. Louis over the next few 
decades.   
 
Twenty years later, Boston looks like the future not the past.  The city and the 
metropolitan area have grown.  More strikingly, the Boston primary metropolitan 
statistical area (the core city and its close suburbs) is the eighth richest metropolitan area 
in the country ranked by per capita income; it is the richest metropolitan area that is 
neither a suburb of New York nor in the Bay Area.  Housing prices—always the surest 
sign that people want to live in a city—have soared.  According to the 2000 census, 
Boston’s median housing value of $233,000 makes it the fourth most expensive 
metropolitan area (after Boulder, Honolulu and Orange County) that is neither in the New 
York nor San Francisco metropolitan statistical areas.  In one sample of 541 cities, four 
of the five cities with the fastest housing price growth between 1980 and 2000 were 
Somerville, Newton, Boston and Cambridge.   
 
The source of Boston’s recent success is not unknown.  Most skilled cities have done 
well over the past two decades, and Boston in 1980 had a strong skill base relative to its 
rustbelt peers like Syracuse and Detroit.  Today, Boston is one of the most educated 
metropolitan areas of the country.  This skill base, which is most strongly related to the 
educational history of the region, enabled Boston to become a successful city in the 
information age.  The Boston region’s dominant industries are now high technology, 
higher education and financial services.  These industries have done extremely well over 
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center for these sectors was itself a result of its historic commitment to skills.     
 
But Boston’s transformation from a dying factory town to a thriving information city is 
only the latest of the region’s remarkable rebirths.  Boston’s history is not a seamless 
story of steady success, but rather a series of crises and restructuring.  For the first 
century of colonial America, Boston had been the largest city in the colonies and had 
thrived as a conduit of goods between the old world and the new.  But during the second 
half of the 18
th century, the city stagnated.  New York and Philadelphia were superior 
ports because of better river access to the rich hinterland and because they were more 
southern and less isolated in New England.   Boston looked as if it was likely to become a 
nostalgic backwater just as the United States were being formed.  
 
However, during the first fifty years of the 19
th century, Boston was able to capitalize on 
its remarkable base of seafaring human capital to become a center for global shipping and 
sailing.  Boston’s comparative advantage was not in its port, but in its people who 
crewed, captained and owned ships that sailed in and out of ports from New York to 
China.  One way to understand this change is that peace and technological improvements 
created an increasingly global maritime economy during the early 19
th century.  Boston’s 
comparative advantage in seafaring became increasingly valuable during this era, and the 
city changed from being an important port for goods coming and going to America, into 
the capital of a vast seafaring empire. 
 
The source of Boston’s early 19
th century success—sailing skills— ensured that Boston’s 
maritime empire would not survive the switch from clipper ships to steam.  Steamships 
required far less human capital than sailing ships, and all of a sudden Boston seemed like 
it was in danger of becoming obsolete.  Indeed, its New England competitors such as 
Salem and New Bedford never really recovered from the switch from sail to steam.  But 
unlike those cities, Boston had acquired, as a last product of its sailing supremacy, a vast 
population of Irish immigrants.  Boston became Irish because the potato famine happened 
to have coincided with the last decade when it was cheaper to get from Liverpool to 
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seems likely that there would have been no substantial Irish population in Boston because 
steerage fares on steamships to New York had become sufficiently cheap.    
 
The initial Irish population which served as the nucleus for a growing city of immigrants 
during the nineteenth century helped to turn Boston from a maritime city in 1840 to an 
industrial city in 1890.  Other factors also mattered.  Fortunes, made off the China trade, 
were reinvested in Boston area manufacturing plants.  Railroads, sometimes also built 
from trading wealth, turned Boston into the railroad hub of New England.  Finally, the 
switch from water power to steam enabled factories to move from rivers like the 
Merrimack to a more central location to save on labor and transportation costs.  Like 
most large American cities during the late 19
th century, Boston did well as a center for the 
industrializing country. 
 
But Boston’s heady period of growth was over by 1920.  Between 1920 and 1950, the 
city population stayed flat, while the country’s population grew by 50 percent.  Between 
1950 and 1980, the city lost population.  In 1910, Boston was the fifth largest city in the 
country.  By 1980, 19 cities were bigger than Boston.  Boston declined for at least four 
separate reasons.  First, Boston was a cold city and over the 20
th century, warm cities 
grew much more quickly than cold cities.  Air conditioning and improvements in public 
health greatly increased the quality of public life in the sunbelt.  Declining transport costs 
freed workers from having to live close to rivers or natural resources.  Instead, people 
could move to warm places that were pleasant to live in.  Second, Boston had been a 
manufacturing town and all manufacturing towns were declining.  Third, the automobile 
was supplanting older forms of personal transportation and central city Boston was 
particularly tied to these older forms of transportation and particularly bad as a driving 
city.  Finally, Boston was a city with high taxes and heavy regulation.  All of these 
factors suggest that Boston’s mid-twentieth century decline was pretty inevitable.   
 
Yet, again Boston has reinvented itself and the past twenty years have been a period of 
enormous success for the region both in terms of incomes and in terms of property 
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Boston has been specializing in skills for almost 400 years.  Among the 200 or so 
metropolitan areas with more than 160,000 residents, the Boston primary metropolitan 
statistical area ranks fifth in share of the population over the age of 25 with college 
degrees (after Boulder, Stamford, Madison, and San Jose) and third in the share of the 
population between 25 and 34 with college degrees (after Boulder and Stamford).  It 
ranks seventh among all metropolitan areas in its share of employees in managerial, 
professional or related professions after Boulder, Corvallis, San Francisco, San Jose, 
Stamford and Washington.  The region’s success has meant that the most pressing 
problem for the area is that its regulation of new construction has meant that not enough 
people have been able to take advantage of the area’s high levels of productivity.   
 
The story of Boston’s history yields the following implications about urban dynamics.  
First, long run urban success does not mean perpetual growth.  Long run urban success 
means successfully responding to challenges.  The basic pattern of Boston’s history is 
that the city specializes in one area and inevitably either this area declines or their 
dominance in the area is challenged.  The survival of the city hinges on re-orientation.  
Boston is a large city while Salem is not, because Boston responded to the decline of sail 
by becoming a manufacturing city while Salem did not.  Boston is a thriving city while 
Detroit is not because when manufacturing declined, Boston was able to redefine itself as 
a high technology city, while Detroit was not. 
 
Second, Boston’s ability to re-orient itself hinged on industrial diversity.  Boston had 
never been just a port and from the beginning, artisans in the town had manufactured 
goods which were then taken on Bostonian ships abroad.  As such, the switch from 
seaport to factory town required a large re-emphasis, but not inventing industry from 
scratch.  Likewise, Boston’s seafaring commerce had always needed financial services, 
and as a result, the city had always had banks, brokers and insurers.  As Boston’s 
manufacturing declined, finance was able to take up its slack.   
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just firms.  The American cities that grew because of proximity to productive natural 
resources, such as coal, have suffered tremendously over the past 50 years. When the 
demand for the key natural resource declined, no one saw any reason to remain in the city 
and they left.  By contrast, from its earliest days, Boston existed not only as a productive 
center but as a place that people wanted to live: a consumer city.  Because people wanted 
to live there, as well as work there, during times of economic trouble, residents innovated 
and stayed.  In the coal towns of central Pennsylvania exodus, not innovation, was a more 
common response.   
  
Fourth, in all of its period of reinvention, Boston’s human capital has been 
critical.  Skills with sailing ships enabled the city to reinvent itself as a global maritime 
center in the early 19
th century. Yankee technology and Irish labor together fueled 
industrialization. And today more than ever, Boston’s skills provide the impetus for 
economic success in technology, professional services and higher education. Boston’s 
experience certainly suggests that human capital is most valuable to a city during 
transition periods when skills create flexibility and the ability to reorient towards a new 
urban focus.   
 
II.  Colonial Dominance and Decline: 1620-1790 
 
Boston became the capital of Massachusetts and the first city of New England because of 
a spring.  In 1629, John Endecott had built a house in Charlestown for Massachusetts’ 
new governor, John Winthrop, to live (Bremer, 2003, p. 192).  Salem, where Endecott 
had been living, was passed over as a capital surely in part because its rocky soil couldn’t 
save its small group of pre-Winthrop settlers from starvation.    By contrast, Charlestown 
offered better farmland, as well as a protected harbor and the Charles river.  Winthrop 
was living in the house that Endecott built by July, 1630, but Winthrop’s fellow settlers 
were soon dying from disease in Charlestown.  Even the limited medical knowledge of 
1630 included the understanding that fresh water was a key to health.  Charlestown’s one 
spring was accessible only during low tide.  Winthrop and his sick companions moved 
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(Bremer, 2003, p. 193).   
 
In 1630, Winthrop had brought 150 settlers to Boston.  By 1640, Boston’s population had 
grown to 1,200 and by 1690, the city had a population of 7,000.  Boston’s colonial 
population appears to have peaked around 1740, with 17,000 residents, and when it 
finally lost its status as the colonies premier status to Philadelphia.  While the exact 
location of Winthrop’s capital owes much to springs, rivers and soil, the longer term 
success of this city was primarily a result of the success of the Massachusetts colony and 
its unusual nature.  Indeed, the special character of the Massachusetts Bay colony can 
help us to understand not only the success of Boston between 1630 and 1740, but also the 
city’s success three centuries later. 
 
Every successful colony prior to Massachusetts had been oriented around extracting 
wealth from the new world and bringing that resource back to Europe.  Spanish 
settlement in the South was driven by silver and gold which enriched the conquistadors, 
who returned to Spain and which funded the vast Hapsburg military machine.  The Dutch 
colony in New Amsterdam and the Swedish colony in what became Delaware were 
essentially trading posts oriented towards acquiring furs from Native Americans.  The 
Virginia settlements soon became plantations from growing tobacco and shipping that 
valuable product back to the old world.  These were extractive settlements built around 
an obvious source of wealth which could be readily exploited, and where many settlers 
sought return to the old country once their fortunes were made.   
  
The Massachusetts’ Bay Colony was fundamentally different.  The settlers brought by 
John Winthrop sought material prosperity certainly, but they had every intention of living 
permanently in Massachusetts.  After all, the Boston settlers saw Stuart London as a 
sinful city to be fled, not as an ideal spot to retire.  Moreover, New England had no 
obvious source of wealth.  As John Smith wrote in 1616, New England’s “main staple, 
from hence to bee extracted for the present to produce the rest, is fish” (Smith, 1616), and 
there was no reason to live in Massachusetts to fish there.  After all, fleets from Europe 
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Virginia extended the simple extractive model of Latin America and the previous trading 
posts, Massachusetts created a new model with settlers with the goal of building a new 
society.  New England offered cheap land to be sure, but no natural export.    
 
The data illustrate the differences between New England and the Southern Colonies.  In 
1700, Virginia and Maryland together exported 317,302 pounds worth of goods (mainly 
tobacco) to England.  These colonies imported only 173,481 pounds worth of goods from 
the mother country.  This trade surplus is not a fluke of that year.  Between 1700 and 
1750, Virginia and Maryland ran trade surpluses in all but three years, and in most years 
the surpluses were enormous.  Virginia’s trade surplus is the hard evidence for the 
extraction of tobacco wealth being brought from the new world to the old.  By contrast, 
between 1697 and 1774, New England ran a trade deficit every year.  In most years, 
imports from England were more than double exports.  New England wasn’t extracting 
wealth from the hinterland and shipping it back to the mother country.  But 
Massachusetts’ residents were still managing to make enough money to pay for the goods 
that they were importing from England.      
 
During the 1630s, the Massachusetts economy operated as something of a colonial Ponzi 
scheme.  Early settlers provided food and other necessities to newer settlers who had 
brought their life’s savings over from England.  As such, the capital needed for old 
settlers to purchase commodities from England was provided by newer settlers who 
bought simple agricultural products at high prices.  But this model requires a high ratio of 
new settlers to old residents.  By 1640, there were already too few people coming from 
England for the model to work and Bostonians needed to find an alternative source of 
funds to buy the products they needed from England. 
 
However, it turns out that their basic model—providing food and other basic goods which 
would never have found a market in England to other colonists—could be slightly 
perturbed and made the basis for the commercial economy of New England.  The soil of 
the extractive economies of the Caribbean and the South was far too valuable to waste on 
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in Massachusetts and shipping it to these richer, southern areas provided the income 
needed to pay for commodities which in turn were bought from England.   In 1770, 73 
percent of Massachusetts shipping left for America, Bermuda and the Caribbean and only 
19 percent left for England.  Shephard and Walton (1972) tell us that in the 1768-1772 
period, 35 percent of the New England exports to the West Indies were fish, 32 percent 
were livestock and 21 percent were wood products.   
 
Why does all this matter for the history of Boston?  In the modern world, urbanization 
and income go closely together.  But in colonial America, the extraction-based colonies 
were richer than Massachusetts.  In 1774, private wealth per free capita was about four 
times higher in the south than in New England (Historical Statistics of the United States, 
p. 1175).  By all accounts, New England seems to have been prospering relative to 
Europe, but Boston’s size was not a result of Massachusetts’ wealth. 
 
Instead, Boston’s size was a result of the way that Massachusetts made its wealth.  
Virginia’s tobacco trade was simple and hinged on dispersion across vast plantations.  
Boats would come down the river to pay cash for bales of tobacco.  No Southern rival 
grew larger than Boston, in part because one relatively simple commodity dominated 
southern life and this didn’t require a commercial or manufacturing center.  But since 
Massachusetts’ produce was worth too little to export to England, the colonial merchants 
had to develop a complex trading system that handled a rich number of commodities 
which were shipped to four separate countries.  Indeed, one third of Boston’s population 
(according to Henretta, 1965) was directly involved in the shipping trades.   
 
Boston’s elite were merchants who grouped together to share risks and learn of the latest 
information about prices and shipments.   Growing tobacco doesn’t hinge on up-to-date 
information.  A mercantile operation that tries to match supply with demand across 
continents inevitably requires face-to-face contact between merchants.   Morison (1961) 
describes how Boston merchants even in the 19
th century “still continued their 
eighteenth-century custom of meeting on ‘change, at one o’clock every week day, to 
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Their information-intensive business required first-hand knowledge which couldn’t be 
gotten by living far from the port.   
 
Surrounding this mercantile elite was a larger population supporting the ocean-going 
trades.  Many of Massachusetts’ exports required some workmanship, especially ships 
and other wood products.  Boston became a certain for this form of manufacturing where 
New England lumber was transformed into finished goods.  Of course, Boston also 
provided support services, such as taverns and boarding houses, for the sailors.  As 
tobacco was so much more valuable per pound than Massachusetts’ exports, the number 
of ships leaving Charleston or other southern ports was also lower than the number of 
ships leaving Boston, even if the value of the cargo was higher.    Since the size of the 
port is more likely to reflect the tonnage of ships than the value of goods, this helps us to 
understand Boston’s size.     
 
Despite Boston’s success, it is worth stressing that while the absence of a cash crop in 
Massachusetts seems to have made Massachusetts more urban than its southern 
competitors, it was still much poorer.   This was not a case of hardship being perversely 
beneficial, at least not in the short run.  Rather it is a case of smart colonists surviving in 
a difficult environment.   
 
Boston grew as a center for commerce and immigration settled in the America’s first 
colony with a balanced economy.  The fact that settlers saw themselves as permanent 
residents combined with the religious nature of the colony (which partially led the settlers 
to want to be permanent in the first place) to create a number of important Boston 
institutions.  From the start, Boston had a much stronger set of community organizations 
than the southern colonies because of its church structure.  Membership in the church was 
a necessity for anyone wanting full membership in the community, and the churches 
organized and disciplined the population.  As a result, Massachusetts had dense social 
networks and something like rule of law, when the southern colonies were far more 
dangerous areas (see Kim, 2003).  The differences in homicide rates, which persist to this 
  10day between New England and the South, date from this period, and it is hard not to think 
that the well functioning church-based organization of Boston played a major role in 
keeping the peace. 
 
A second important feature of Boston’s religion-based permanence was its tradition of 
democratic egalitarianism.  The Puritan’s Calvinist ethos tended to imply political 
equality between the righteous.  As a result, all church-goers, regardless of wealth, had 
equal political rights in the community.  Moreover, as the reformation directly challenged 
the hierarchical nature of the Catholic Church and tried to replace it with a bottom-up 
“congregational” system, Boston’s traditions of direct democracy, home rule and town 
meetings come from this era.   
 
The final, remarkable feature of Boston, which again comes from the fact that it was a 
balanced, permanent and religious colony, was its focus on education.  The Boston Latin 
School was founded in 1635 and Harvard College was founded, with government money, 
the next year.  These institutions were meant originally to train ministers, but they 
flourished in a community that valued learning.  Again, the Calvinist attention to literacy 
surely mattered, but the more complex Massachusetts economy also demanded more 
widespread knowledge than the tobacco culture of the south.  Harvard’s earliest graduates 
were men of the cloth, but increasingly a Harvard education provided valuable 
background for merchants and lawyers in a world where literacy and knowledge 
increased earnings.   
 
This is not to say that the Southern land-holders of the 18
th century weren’t sometimes 
enormously well educated, but in the South learning appears to have been more of a 
consumption good than an aid in production.  After all, both Adams and Jefferson were 
extraordinarily well educated and knowledgeable men.  Adams earned his living with his 
learning excelling in Boston’s complex legal world.  Jefferson’s learning helped him 
found universities and write the Declaration of Independence, but by all accounts, he was 
a pretty unsuccessful plantation manager, and there is no evidence to suggest that his 
learning ever helped him increase his earnings.   
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The economy of Massachusetts Bay both drove Boston’s early success and helps us to 
understand some of its social, political and educational traditions.  Of course, natural 
conditions also mattered.  Boston’s sheltered harbor facilitated trade.  Boston’s colder 
climate also helped the urbanization process.  While in the 20
th century, warm areas have 
done well, in the 17
th century, warmth was better for microbes than for humans.  As a 
result, the Southern colonies were generally far more disease prone than New England 
and when people concentrated into cities the risks of disease increased even further.   
 
Still, despite these advantages, in the mid-18
th century Boston was being surpassed by 
first Philadelphia and then New York.  To a large extent, the growth of these cities and 
their surrounding countryside followed the Massachusetts, not the Virginia, model.  Like 
Massachusetts, the Penn Family’s colony was based on available land and widespread 
permanent settlement, not on a single cash crop.  Like Massachusetts, Pennsylvania ran 
large trade deficits with England and made them up with trade with southern colonies and 
the Indies.  Philadelphia would surpass Boston because land in Pennsylvania was much 
better than land in New England, because Philadelphia was closer to the markets in the 
Indies and in the South, and because the Schuylkill is a much more navigable river than 
the Charles.  By the 1760s, Philadelphia’s port became busier than the port of Boston 
because of these natural advantages.   
 
During much of the later half of the 18
th century, Boston slumped.  Its population barely 
grew from 17,000 in 1740 to 18,300 in 1790.  This slow population growth is certainly 
associated with Massachusetts losing ground relative to New York and Pennsylvania.  
Between 1740 and 1790, the population of Massachusetts more than doubled, but the 
population of those other two states increased five-fold.  But Boston’s dominance over 
Massachusetts was much weaker than New York and Philadelphia’s dominance over 
their own states during this era.  For example, in 1790, all New York State shipping went 
through New York City and more than 95 percent of Pennsylvania shipping went through 
Philadelphia.   
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Somewhat remarkably (from the modern perspective), Boston was only one of three 
Massachusetts cities that were among the ten largest cities in America’s first census (the 
other two being Marblehead and Salem).  In the late colonial period, about 5,000 tons of 
salted cod alone was shipped out of Salem, most of it to parts of the Spanish empire.   
While Boston offered better access to the American hinterland, Salem was a better 
fishing port.  This helps us understand how Massachusetts remained the most important 
seafaring colony, although Boston was no longer the most important seafaring city in the 
thirteen colonies.  
 
III.  1790-1920:  Immigrants and Manufacturing 
 
While Boston’s population stagnated between 1740 and 1790, Boston’s population 
surged after that year and grew steadily for the next 130 years.  The town of 1790 with 
18,000 residents became a city of 748,000 in 1920.  Figure 1 shows the time path of 
Boston’s population.  Over the 1790-1890 period, Boston’s population grew steadily by 
3.2 percent per year, or 37 percent per decade.   The 1790s were a typical decade.  
Boston’s population increased from 18,320 to 24,937 for a 36 percent increase.  The best 
decade for Boston’s population growth between 1790 and 1900 was the 1830s when 
population grew by 51 percent and the worst decade was the 1880s when population only 
grew by 24 percent.   
 
Of course, America as a whole was growing remarkably over this period.  The new 
republic had 3.9 million Americans in 1790 and 106 million in 1920.  Was Boston 
growing faster than the U.S. as a whole?  Figure 2 shows change over time in the ratio of 
the population of Boston to the population of the U.S. as a whole.  During the 1790-1830 
period, Boston grew at about the same rate as the country as a whole.  4.6 percent of 
Americans lived in Boston in 1790 and 4.7 percent of Americans lived in Boston forty 
years later.  Starting in 1830, for fifty years, Boston started growing at a much faster rate 
than the country as a whole, and by 1880 7.2 percent of Americans were living in Boston.  
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then began its eighty year decline. 
 
Two other benchmarks are useful to put Boston’s growth in perspective.  Figure 3 shows 
Boston’s population relative to the population of Massachusetts as a whole and relative to 
the city of New York.  Boston’s population relative to Massachusetts rises during every 
decade from 1790 and 1880 and declines during every subsequent decade.  The growth 
period represents the increasing urbanization of New England.  The decline period is 
somewhat misleading because the bulk of Massachusetts growth during this later period 
has been in areas which can fairly be called satellites of Boston.   
 
The relationship between Boston population and New York population is more 
straightforward.  Boston loses population relative to New York in every decade outside of 
the 1860-1880 period.  After all, during 1790-1890 when Boston grew at a 3.2 annual 
rate, New York grew at an even more impressive 3.9 percent annual rate.  When a town 
grows from 18,000 to 450,000 in a century, it seems like the big story is that increase, not 
the fact that some other cities grew even more quickly.  There were some cities that grew 
far more slowly.  While Salem’s population eventually reached 40,000, its growth rate 
over the 1790-1890 period was an anemic 1.36 percent per year.  While Boston was the 
third largest city in the country in 1790, somewhat remarkably it remained the fifth 
largest city in the country as late as 1910. 
 
How can we understand the growth of Boston during the 19
th century?  The available 
evidence suggests that Boston’s growth during the 1790-1840 period followed the 
maritime pattern set during the colonial era.  Unlike New York, Philadelphia or even 
Baltimore, Boston appears to have been overwhelmingly oriented towards trade and 
fishing.  As late as 1840, the Census reports that Boston had 10,813 people in the ocean-
going professions and only 5,333 people in manufacturing.  By contrast, New York had 
43,390 people working in manufacturing and only 2,786 residents in the ocean-going 
trades.  In fact, Lowell, not Boston, was Massachusetts’ first city of manufacturing with 
8,936 people working in the textile mills.  Boston had more sea-going occupants than all 
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by 1840, Boston remained centered on the sea just as it had been 100 years earlier. 
 
How did an ocean-going orientation lead to growth between 1790 and 1840 when it had 
led to stagnation between 1740 and 1790?  During the 1740-1790 period, international 
wars cut Boston off from trading partners (notably Spain), British mercantilism 
constrained colonial shipping development and, under the Articles of Confederation, state 
policies blocked Boston merchants from intra-U.S. trade.  As a result, U.S. shipping as a 
whole grew only modestly during this era, and Boston’s share of that shipping clearly 
declined as it was passed by more southerly ports.   
 
After 1790, the constitution broke down the barriers to national trade.  The U.S. was no 
longer constrained from trading with Britain’s enemies (and indeed the U.S. fought a war 
in part over our right to trade with whomever it pleased). No imperial tariffs constrained 
Boston merchants.  And so while total U.S. exports and imports were worth $20 million 
in 1790 ($391 million in today’s dollars), by 1840, total exports and imports were worth 
$239 million (or $4.9 billion today).  The increase in trade certainly gave a boost to all of 
America’s ports.   
 
But if the pre-1790 trends had continued, we might have expected New England to have a 
smaller and smaller share of an increasingly large amount of American water-borne trade.  
However, somewhat surprisingly between 1816 (the first available year for comparison) 
and 1840 New England’s share of trade appears to have risen.  In 1791, 38 percent of 
U.S. merchant vessel tonnage was in New England ships. In 1841, New England’s share 
of merchant vessel tonnage was up to 58 percent (Albion, 1932).  Morison (1961) reports 
that between1798 and 1855, the Boston Customs’ District ownership of shipping rose 
from 81,000 to 546,000 tons.   
 
This fact doesn’t mean that Boston’s share of American exports and imports was rising.  
It wasn’t.  In 1821, 21 percent of America’s imports and exports were handled by Boston 
and 29 percent were handled by New York.  Twenty years later, New York’s share was 
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outclassed by New York’s harbor along many dimensions, and the opening of the Erie 
Canal just made things worse.  As a port for products coming from or going to the 
American hinterland, New York was vastly superior to Boston and we can’t be surprised 
at New York’s rise relative to Boston. 
 
But the boats that landed in New York were to a large extent owned and operated by New 
Englanders, often Bostonians.  As Albion (1932) writes “Yankees captured New York 
Port around 1820 and dominated its activity at least until the Civil War.”  Indeed, during 
the same era when Boston was losing its importance as a port of entry, Boston and New 
England were increasing their control over the shipping fleets.  Between 1811 and 1851, 
New England’s share of foreign commerce fell from 28 percent to 11 percent while New 
York’s share of foreign commerce rose from 21 percent to 52 percent.  Over the same 
four decades, the share of registered tonnage owned by New Englanders increased from 
45 percent to 58 percent (all figures in Albion, 1931).  Boston shipyards were providing 
the boats, Boston’s merchants owned these ships and its sailors operated them, even 
though they were sailing into New York. 
  
If New York was America’s best port, what was Boston doing with all the sailors and 
ship-owners?  The best explanation for this puzzle is Adam Smith’s classic doctrine of 
comparative advantage.  The essence of maritime trade is mobility.  A community that 
has skills in mining coal will still not lead to a coal mining community if there is no coal 
in the area.  You can’t move a mine.  But a community with seafaring skills can easily 
supply ships and sailors throughout the world, because ships can move.  Boston exploited 
its early edge as a maritime community, which stretched back into the 16
th century, to 
become the capital of a vast maritime empire.  Boston was generally just the spot where 
the ships began their voyages and where many of the sailors returned home, but this was 
enough to give the city in the early 19
th century its maritime wealth.   
 
What was Boston’s comparative advantage in the maritime industries?  In one aspect of 
the trade, New England was well suited—its access to lumber.  New England’s large 
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(and many English ships as well) for decades.  Unsurprisingly though, this industry 
gradually shifted to Maine which has even more forests.  Boston’s northerly location is a 
plus for some forms of fishing, especially access to plentiful fish off the Canadian coast.  
Likewise, proximity to Canada and England was worth something in trade. 
 
But the real advantage of Boston in seafaring was not geography but human capital.  
Operating and managing sailing ships requires skill.  As Morison (1961) writes “even an 
ordinary seaman was expected ‘to hand, reef and steer, ... to be able to reeve all the 
studdingsail gear, and set a topgallant or royal studdingsail out of the top; to loose and 
furl a royal, and a small topgallant-sail or flying jib; and perhaps, also to send or cross a 
royal yard.’”   Certainly, these skills could be learned by Pennsylvania farmboys (and 
Massachusetts’ farmboys for that matter), but children who were sons of seamen who 
grew up in New England’s fishing and seafaring towns certainly began with a big 
advantage.  The importance of maritime human capital didn’t stop at the forecastle.  
Large maritime fortunes were often founded by sea captains who had themselves all of 
the skills of mates and more besides.  The skills required in leading a multi-year, multi-
continent trading voyage that involved dealing with cultures as disparate as the Northwest 
Indians (who sold the Boston traders otter furs) and the Chinese Court of Canton (who 
traded high end China goods for those same otter furs) were also enormous.   
 
As ships got faster and as peace and independence made it possible to establish trading 
routes that traveled thousands of miles, Boston’s advantage in human capital made it a 
natural capital for a trading empire.  Furthermore, Boston had institutions like maritime 
insurance, begun in 1724 by Joseph Marion, that were complements to international 
trade.  When trading high-value products that had traveled thousands of miles, the 
disadvantage of starting and ending the journey at Boston relative to New York became 
minimal.  Far more important was the skill and entrepreneurship that Boston merchants 
brought to the exploitation of international trade routes. 
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supported Boston’s growth.  Perhaps the most dynamic fishing industry in the 1800-1850 
period was whaling.  Whaling was a small 18
th century industry, but in the 19
th century, 
Massachusetts whaling became big business.  At one point, manufacturing whale 
products was the third largest industry in Massachusetts.  The big innovation of the 19
th 
century seems to have been whaling in the Pacific Ocean, both in the tropical south seas 
and in arctic waters.  Nantucket and especially New Bedford were the centers of the 
whaling trade, but certainly the success of these centers boosted demand for services and 
goods provided in Boston.   Whaling shows again the pattern of New Englanders with 




Perhaps the best single piece of evidence that it was sail-specific human capital that drove 
Boston’s maritime dominance in the first half of the 19
th century is that this dominance 
disappeared quickly with the move to steam.  Steamships were not only generally 
superior for most trips, but like many engine-driven technologies, steamships radically 
reduced the skill requirements of operation.  Moreover, the skills involved were not the 
same as the skills involved in rigging a clipper ship.  New England even lost its edge in 
ship-building which increasingly involved iron and steel, rather than wood.  This change 
in technology was perhaps the single most important factor driving the decline of Boston 
as a port and the decline of the Boston shipping industry.  If Boston’s growth in the first 
half of the 19
th century depended on the maritime industries, Boston’s growth in the latter 
half of that century occurred despite maritime decline.   
 
The Boston Irish 
 
While Boston’s shipping empire would not continue throughout the 19
th century, one by-
product of its maritime dominance in the 1840s would profoundly shape the entire future 
of the city.  The 1840s and the 1850s, which were the last great period of Boston 
shipping, happen to have coincided with one of the great agricultural disasters of 
European history:  the Irish Potato Famine.  In the modern era, when a flood of 
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York.  These areas offer proximity or strong labor markets to people leaving Latin 
America or Asia.   
 
In the 1840s, Boston was the closest American port to Liverpool and the abundance of 
Boston sailing ships meant that fares to Boston were lower than fares to anywhere else in 
the U.S.  The Liverpool-Boston fares were often less than 20 dollars.  As a result, we 
shouldn’t be surprised that many Irish emigrants, often on the verge of starvation, 
minimized transport costs and came to the nearest harbor.  If the potato famine had 
happened even 30 years later, Boston’s transport edge would have been gone, and 
steamships would have bypassed Boston entirely heading straight for New York.  Indeed, 
Boston’s share of immigrants coming to America was far higher in the 1840s than 
Boston’s share of the immigrants during the 1880s and 1890s. 
 
Between 1845 and 1855, 208,000 immigrants came to America through Boston.   This 
represented 6.6 percent of total immigration into the U.S. during that time period, during 
an era when Boston’s base population was less than .6 percent of the total population of 
the U.S.  This share substantially underestimates Boston’s share of Irish immigration, 
since the Irish came disproportionately to Boston and the Germans arrived 
disproportionately in New York.  Boston’s population rose by about 43,000 during both 
the 1850s and the 1860s and almost doubled its population over that 20 year period.  At 
the same time, Boston was changing from a Yankee town into an Irish city.   In 1840, less 
than 30 percent of Bostonians were foreigners or first generation Americans.  By 1880, 
64 percent of the city was foreign born or first generation.  The overwhelming share of 
the foreign born and their children were Irish.  Success with the sailing ship made Boston 
Irish.   
 
Of course, Boston’s attraction for the Irish continued after the Civil War.  To a certain 
extent, this reflected some continuing maritime vitality, but to a much greater extent, Irish 
immigrants came to a city with a thriving Irish network.  In many cases, Irish Bostonians 
funded their relatives coming to Boston.  In other cases, as in almost all immigrant 
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who shared their culture and preferences.  Indeed, the gain from ethnic concentration was 
even greater in an age when native Protestant gangs were known to terrorize the Irish.  
Indeed, this violence was so common that one nativist mob even stormed an Urusuline 
Convent in Watertown. 
 
Manufacturing in New England 
 
Cheap sailing ship fares brought the Irish to Boston, but these migrants wouldn’t have 
stayed without economic opportunities.  The economic success of late 19
th century 
Boston combined low-wage Irish labor with Yankee capital and factory technologies.  
While the Boston of 1840 was a seafaring town, the Irish Bostonians of 1880 were 
overwhelmingly involved in manufacturing (and for women, the service trades).  
Boston’s success before 1920 depended on its ability to employ Irish and native workers 
in factory jobs. 
 
New England manufacturing actually began during the 1800-1840 period, but Lowell, not 
Boston, was Massachusetts’ largest manufacturing town.  Lowell was established in the 
1820s as a textile center and was named after Francis Cabot Lowell.  Lowell himself 
came from a Boston mercantile family, and the capital used to fund the Lowell mills 
came from sea trading profits.  Boston’s seafaring past also supported its industrial 
development because Lowell had studied English factories and made them the basis for 
his Massachusetts operation.   
 
But while the capital for the Lowell mills came from Boston and technology came from 
England, the Lowell mills were put in a rural area northwest of Boston.  While Lowell’s 
original factory was on the Charles at Waltham, textile mills depended on a water-borne 
power and the Charles was too small of a river to support the mill.  As such, it was 
natural to move the operation to the closest big river to Boston: the Merrimac.  As such, 
Lowell was founded at the site of an existing dam on the Merrimack (see Temin, 2000).   
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1840, Lowell had more than 20,000 residents and more than 8,000 workers.  The Lowell 
labor force was predominantly female.  Sklar (1993) documents the strong New England 
educational system that ensured that women were unusually well-educated for the time 
period, and as such they provided a first-rate and inexpensive labor force. 
 
Many of the earliest New England factories were spread throughout the hinterland, and 
not located in New England’s largest city.  Chauncey Jerome established his pioneering 
clock factory in Litchfield county, Connecticut.  Samuel Colt’s hand gun factory was in 
Hartford, Connecticut.  Southern New England was the birthplace of American 
industrialization, and this industrialization was led by entrepreneurs like Lowell, Jerome 
and Colt. Sokoloff (1988) documents that during much of the ante-bellum period, 
Southern New England was the most inventive area of the country, leading the U.S. in 
patents per capita across all fields and in manufacturing in particular.   As Temin (2000) 
argues, the central forces behind New England’s growth appear to be the region’s 
“commitment to education” and “clear laws and a judicial process that allowed laws to 
adapt to new problems undreamed of by the original legislators” (Temin, 2000, p. 110). 
 
But while manufacturing began in smaller towns throughout the Massachusetts area, the 
city of Boston gradually became a more and more important center for industry.  While 
the Boston of 1840 was oriented towards the wharf, the Boston of 1890 was a 
manufacturing town whose workforce labored in factories.  One side of this 
transformation is the decline of Boston’s port which, as discussed above, was the natural 
result of New York’s vast geographic advantage and the irrelevance of New England 
sailing acumen in the age of steam.  The other side of this transformation is the increasing 
location of factories within the city of Boston and in its near suburbs.   The story of late 
19
th century Boston is the increasing centralization of New England manufacturing in the 
city of Boston. 
 
Boston’s rise as a center for manufacturing is neither unique nor surprising.  As Kim 
(1995) has documented, all of manufacturing became more concentrated in the late 19
th 
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th century were strewn across the American 
northeast, by the start of the 20
th century, industry and manufacturing was centralized in a 
few large metropolitan areas.  In 1870, the ten largest cities in the U.S. had a total of 3.7 
million inhabitants or 9.5 percent of the total U.S. population.  By 1920, the ten largest 
cities had 15.4 million residents or 14.4 percent of the overall U.S. population.  Boston’s 
growth during this period was certainly spectacular, but it was hardly unique.  New York, 
Chicago, and even Philadelphia had growth rates that were similarly impressive.   
 
Table 1 shows the population in 1860 and 1920 of the ten largest cities in the U.S. as of 
1860.  The table makes it clear that Boston’s 320% growth rate, while high, was hardly 
unusual.  In this table, four cities grew more slowly than Boston and five grew more 
quickly.  The average growth rate in this table is 563%, which is much higher than 
Boston’s growth rate.    
 
Indeed, one can reasonably take the view that Boston underperformed during this period, 
if it is compared to other Northern cities.  Expanding our analysis to the 20 largest cities 
in the U.S. in 1860, Boston’s growth rate ranks fourteenth.  Excluding the three cities 
below the Mason-Dixon (Baltimore, Louisville and New Orleans), Boston again ranks 
thirteenth out of seventeen cities.  The only Northern cities with more than 45,000 
residents in 1860 that grew more slowly than Boston were Albany, Cincinnati, and 
Philadelphia.  Indeed, an even more spectacular fact is that America’s urban population 
as a whole grew by 772 percent over this sixty year period.  Understanding Boston’s 
growth between 1860 and 1920 does not require understanding Boston-specific factors, 
but rather the general forces which were causing a population explosion in all of 
America’s cities.  
 
Four factors drove the rise of cities in the late 19
th century: increasing agricultural 
productivity, changing manufacturing technologies, improvements in transportation and 
the related rise in immigration.  As urbanists have emphasized for decades, if not 
centuries, increasing urbanization critically requires improvements in the productivity of 
farms.  In 1860, 58 percent of gainful workers were in agriculture.  In 1920, 26 percent of 
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has been a net exporter of food products throughout its history, this change means that in 
1860, the average farmer was feeding four non-farmers.  In 1920, the average farmer was 
feeing 8.5 non-farmers.
1  If caloric consumption stayed relatively constant, this tells us 
that farm output per farmer needs to have more than doubled over this sixty-year period 
for the U.S. to be fed by its agriculturalists.    
 
The available evidence suggests that productivity did increase by at least this amount.  In 
1840, it took 233 man hours to produce 100 bushels of wheat.  By 1880, it took 152 man 
hours to produce the same 100 bushels and by 1920, only 90 man hours were needed to 
produce those bushels.  A similar improvement occurred in corn production which 
required 276 man hours to produce 100 bushels in 1840 and 122 man hours to produce 
100 bushels in 1920 (Historical Statistics Series K 445-485).     
 
Typically, increases in farm productivity are divided into technological improvements, 
which generally increase the amount of land that a farmer can sow and reap, and 
biological improvements, which increase the productivity per acre.  Certainly, Cyrus 
McCormick’s mechanical reaper is one of the great technological innovations in the 
history of agriculture.  This nineteenth century innovation meant that the time it took to 
harvest one acre of wheat dropped from 20 hours in 1830 to less than one hour in 1895.  
But despite this innovation, land per farm fell during the 1860-1920 period.  Land per 
farmer and farm land per U.S. citizen also fell.  Farmland per agricultural worker 
increased from 66 acres per worker in 1860 to 86 acres per worker in 1920, or a 30 
percent increase.  Thus, while some of the increase in productivity came from more land 
per worker, the bulk of the increase in agricultural productivity came from more efficient 
use of land, not bigger farms.   
 
                                                 
1 These statistics are somewhat misleading because a large number of farmers were producing non-food 
crops such as cotton and tobacco.  However, if the share of farmers producing these products stayed 
relatively constant over this period, then the same doubling of productivity is needed to feed the 
increasingly non-agricultural share of the population.   
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th century saw an 
explosion in the use of commercial fertilizer.  In 1860, 164,000 short tons of fertilizer 
were consumed in the U.S.  By 1920, 7.2 million short tons of fertilizer were consumed 
(Historical Statistics Series K 192-194).  This forty-fold increase in the use of fertilizer 
helped increase crop yields per acre substantially.  Second, the location of farms within 
the United States changed substantially over this period.  In 1860, 71 percent of U.S. 
farmland was in Northeastern and Southern states of the U.S.  By 1920, only 42 percent 
of farmland was in these areas.  The spread of U.S. population across the continent meant 
that farmers moved from the lower productivity land of New England to the enormously 
productive farms of states like Iowa.  
 
This spread of population would have been impossible without the rise of railroads which 
shipped farm products across the vast American hinterland.  In 1860, there were 30,626 
miles of rail in the United States.  By 1920, 406,580 miles of railroad track were in 
operation.  This vast increase sped the flow of farm products, but it also led to the 
development of cities which generally became vast hubs of railroad lines. Eight 
independent railroad lines going into Boston were opened in the 20 years between 1835 
and 1855 alone.  This massive improvement in transportation technology would also play 
a critical role in the development of large urban areas. 
 
The development of cities is almost always driven by a desire to save on transportation 
costs.  In the 17
th century, Boston’s growth hinged on its importance as the major port for 
New England.  In the 19
th century, Boston, like all of the big cities discussed above, 
became a major rail center for the northeast.  If a factory’s products were to be shipped 
throughout the New England area, then Boston offered an optimal location.  Just as 
Chicago became the hub of the Midwest because of its railroads, Boston’s dominance 
over New England occurred in part because of its central position as a railroad hub. 
 
But Boston had been a transport hub in 1820, and the Boston Associates still decided to 
set up their factories along the Merrimac.  What had changed?  There were two related 
changes within manufacturing technology that supported the urbanization of factories.  
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part of the 19
th century, factories spread across New England in large part to take 
advantage of the power created by water mills.  By the late 19
th century, the cost 
advantages of this form of technology had been eroded by the rapid proliferation of 
stationary steam engine, which were powering an increasingly large share of New 
England manufacturing.  In 1838, there were 31 stationary steam engines in New 
England.  By 1900, there were 14,245 such engines.  Steam engines freed factories from 
the rivers and enabled them to locate in large urban areas. 
 
Of all cities, perhaps Boston was the most changed by steam technology.  In the 19
th 
century, the Back Bay was filled in and this massive public works project permanently 
changed the physical structure of the city.  This would not have been possible without 
steam shovels.   
 
The second technological change that supported the urbanization of industry was the 
reduction in the space requirements of factories.  The early textile mills had been vast 
edifices which required large amounts of physical areas for big machines. Increasingly  
“such technical innovations as the lathe and sewing machine permitted the use of small 
machines which were neither expensive of space nor specialized in their structural 
requirements so that the upper stories of vacant warehouses and even the attics of 
adjacent tenements were rapidly converted into workshop premises” (Ward, 1966).   As a 
result of these changes, industrial entrepreneurs didn’t need to locate in empty space 
where land was cheap.  Instead, they could locate in the heart of the city and reap the 
advantages of proximity to suppliers, customers and workers.   
 
This last urban advantage—proximity to workers—is particularly important in explaining 
the development of urban manufacturing.  As discussed above, Boston served as the 
entryway for the vast Irish immigration.  But the primary importance of the Irish 
immigration wave is not that the Irish came through Boston, but that they decided to stay 
there.  In earlier times, immigrants came through Boston but didn’t settle there.  By the 
late 19
th century, both immigrants to the U.S. and rural-urban migrants were deciding to 
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urbanization of manufacturing, but there were reasons beyond labor demand that cities 
increasingly attracted residents.   
 
For example, public transportation made it possible to travel around Boston more cheaply 
than traveling around low density communities.  Big cities offered a much richer array of 
social activities than low density farming communities.  For recent Catholic immigrants, 
who were often subject to violent nativist antipathy, dense urban areas facilitated the 
formation of segregated communities which could be defended.  Furthermore, the 
tremendous health disadvantages that cities once had were being eroded by tremendous 
advances in public health (especially the rise of clean water) in the late 19
th century.  For 
these reasons, big cities were becoming more attractive places to live, not just places to 
work.   
 
IV.  1920-1980:  The Declining City 
 
Boston’s population did not start declining in absolute terms until after 1950, but relative 
to the U.S. as a whole, the city’s collapse began in 1920.  Between 1920 and 1980, 
Boston fell from containing .7 percent of the U.S. population to .25 percent of the U.S. 
population.  Boston’s population as a whole fell from 750,000 in 1920 to 560,000 sixty 
years later.  Figure 4 shows the ratio of Boston’s population to the combined populations 
of Suffolk, Middlesex and Norfolk counties.  As Figure 5 shows, the counties 
surrounding Boston fared considerably better.  Both Middlesex and Norfolk counties 
gained population over this period, but as Figure 6 shows, both of the larger counties 
(Suffolk and Middlesex) lost population substantially relative to the U.S. as a whole. 
 
Why did Boston decline so much during the middle decades of the 20
th century?   There 
are four important factors that explain the absolute loss of population in Boston as a city 
and the relative loss of population in the outlying counties: (1) weather, (2) transportation 
technology, (3) the decline of manufacturing, and (4) government policies.  I will 
document the relative importance of each of these factors in turn. 
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No variable can explain state and city growth over the past 80 years as reliably as 
temperature.  Warm places grew significantly in the 20
th century.  Cold places also grew, 
but much more slowly.  Figure 7 shows the relationship between average January 
temperature in a state and the population growth of that state between 1920 and 1980.  
Average January temperature is the average January temperature between 1961 and 1990 
taken from the 2000 Statistical Abstract of the U.S., Table 408.
2  The growth rate of 
population is the change in the logarithm of state population, which can be interpreted 
loosely as the percentage growth in state population.
3  The correlation coefficient 
between average January temperature and state population growth over this period is 48 
percent.  The line in the graph tells us that as January temperature rises by 1 percent, the 
expected growth rate of the state increases by 2.3 percent.   
 
Another way to think about the impact of temperature is that the average growth rate of 
the 25 states with mean January temperatures less than 29.7 degrees was 95 percent.  The 
average growth rate of the 25 states with mean January temperature above 29.7 degrees 
was 309 percent.  The connection between temperature and population growth is quite 
strong over this period, and this is certainly one reason why Massachusetts’ population 
grew only modestly over this period. 
 
Why did warm places grow so much more quickly than poor places?  There are two 
important sets of explanations for this fact.  First, a series of technological improvements 
disproportionately improved life in hot states.  Most obviously, the air conditioner made 
it possible to live comfortably, and perhaps even more importantly to have factories in 
hot climes.  Improvements in public health meant that diseases, such as malaria and 
cholera that used to regularly kill the residents of Southern states, were brought under 
control.   
 
                                                 
2 The table generally lists the average January average for one major city in the state.  In the few cases 
where multiple cities were included, I averaged the temperatures across these cities.    
3 I use the change in the logarithm of state population instead of the actual percentage growth in population, 
because the logarithmic measure tends to be less sensitive to extreme values, especially among states that 
begin with a particularly low level of population.   
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states, which had once thrived because of proximity to natural resources and rivers.  The 
average city of 1900 had been located in places which had an advantage in producing 
manufactured goods and shipping them by water.  As the cost of moving goods 
plummeted by over 90 percent in real terms during the 20
th century (see Glaeser and 
Kohlhase, 2003), these production advantages disappeared and people moved to places 
that were distinguished mainly by their advantages as consumer cities (see Glaeser, 
Kolko and Saiz, for an analysis of the consumer city phenomenon).  Cold cities were 
unpleasant to live in and as a result, people moved west and south in search of more 
pleasant climes.  Firms were no longer tied to the northeast and eventually followed the 
workers. 
 
But the decline of cold cities can only partially explain the decline of Boston.  After all, 
cold weather is shared by all of Massachusetts, but the state grew much more quickly 
than the city of Boston did.  As a whole, the state of Massachusetts grew by 49 percent 
between 1920 and 1980, which is much slower than the national population growth rate 
of 98 percent, and this gap is perhaps primarily explained by Massachusetts’ cold 
weather.  Still, the city of Boston fell by 25 percent over this time period.  Something 
more than cold weather must be to blame. 
 
Beyond the weather, the second great force moving urban populations over the mid-20
th 
century was sprawl.  Old, dense cities declined and lower density cities, particularly those 
on the edge of traditional downtowns, boomed.  The primary reason for this rise of 
sprawling cities is the rise of the automobile.  The traditional American cities were built 
first around walking and then around public transportation.  Boston’s oldest areas, such 
as Beacon Hill and the waterfront, are built at sufficiently high densities to accommodate 
foot-borne travelers.  19
th century areas, such as Back Bay, Roxbury or nearby suburbs 
such as Brookline, were built around the early forms of public transportation such as 
omnibuses and then streetcars.  These forms of transportation require bigger roads and 
allow people to travel larger distances, but they still require people to walk to and from 
bus stops.  As such, the densities need to be moderate. 
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The automobile requires a completely different level of construction.  Roads must be an 
order of magnitude when they are meant to accommodate cars rather than buses, because 
the area used by a car traveler is at least ten times greater than the area used by someone 
using public transportation.  Furthermore, cars need parking lots which are themselves 
enormously space intensive.  It is possible to drive in a city built at pedestrian densities, 
but it isn’t pleasant, as anyone who drives around central Paris or Wall Street can attest.  
The rise of the automobile inevitably meant that people would increasingly move to 
lower density communities that could be designed around the new technology.  Indeed, 
much of 20
th century urban history can be seen as the rise of decentralized communities 
which is itself the result of the technological dominance of the automobile. 
 
The rise of the car meant that cities that were built at high densities inevitably suffered 
because high densities tend to be incompatible with the automobile.  Indeed, the 
correlation between a city’s density in 1920 and its use of public transportation 60 years 
later is more than 50 percent.  Since high density cities, like Boston, were badly suited to 
the dominant new transportation technology, those cities tended to lose population. 
 
This fact can be seen in Figure 7 which shows the relationship between urban density in 
1920 and growth over the next 60 years.  The correlation coefficient between initial 
density and urban growth is –44.8 percent.  The line in the graph tells us that as a city’s 
density in 1920 increases by 1000 people per square mile, the expected growth rate of the 
city declines by 5.6 percent.  Put another way, the median growth rate of the 68 cities 
among the 100 largest in 1920 with less than 10,000 people per square mile was 43 
percent.  The median growth rate of the cities with more than 10,000 people per square 
mile was -20 percent.  Boston’s density level in 1920 was 17,200 people per square mile, 
making it the eighth densest of America’s large cities.   As such, its low growth isn’t 
much of a surprise.  Boston was a highly dense city in a cold state.  Throughout the 
middle years of the 20
th century, those two factors almost always led to declining 
population levels.   
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had other features which also generally led to urban decline.  As I discussed in the 
previous section, Boston in 1920 was a manufacturing city and its success had come in 
large part from its ability to employ large numbers of immigrant workers in factories.  In 
general, manufacturing cities did extremely poorly during the middle 20
th century.  The 
factors which made it natural for industry to urbanize in the late 19
th centuries, such as 
access to ports and rail depots, disappeared in the 20
th century.  Manufacturing left cities 
for suburbs, which could easily be accessed by trucks.  Manufacturing left the northeast 
for the sunbelt, which had a much less pro-union environment (see Holmes, 1994, for the 
classic analysis showing the positive effect of right-to-work laws on employment).  
Finally, low transportation costs even made it possible for manufacturing to locate 
outside of the U.S. entirely to take advantage of cheap labor costs. 
 
The net result of these factors was a dramatic decline of those cities which had 
specialized in manufacturing.  Figure 9 shows the relationship between the share of 
workers in manufacturing industries and city growth between 1920 and 1980.  
Unfortunately, due to data availability, I have been forced to use the share of 
manufacturing in 1980, rather than 1920, which is less than ideal.  The graph illustrates 
the strong negative relationship between manufacturing and urban decline.  Cities that 
were manufacturing centers generally did poorly during the 20
th century urban success, 
and Boston may have suffered for this reason as well.    
 
A final reason for Boston’s difficulties during the middle years of the 20
th century is city 
government.  The 1920-1950 period in Boston was the era of James Michael Curley, and 
Curley set a pattern of large spending and inflammatory rhetoric.  Curley’s success can 
itself be traced to the longstanding hostility between the city’s poorer Irish population 
and its wealthier Protestant residents.  This ethnic division, accompanied by sharp income 
disparities between the two groups, set the stage for Curleyism, which included large-
scale public projects and a general program of redistribution from the Yankee rich to the 
Irish poor.  Unsurprisingly, this program pushed the rich out of the city.   
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city growth, but Figure 10 shows the relationship between city growth between 1920 and 
1980 and per capita taxes in 1980.  Again, somewhat problematically, I am forced to use 
taxes and income in 1980 due to data availability.  I have divided per capita city taxes by 
per capita income in 1980.  These taxes are meant to include city-level taxes from all 
sources.  The graph shows a significant negative relationship, and also shows that Boston 
is among the highest tax cities in the sample.  The line in the graph tells us that as taxes 
(relative to income) rise by one percent, the expected growth rate during the 1920-1980 
period declines by six percent.   
 
Boston had a number of features which drove its decline during the middle decades of the 
20
th century.  It built at density levels too high for the automobile to function effectively 
and it was located in a cold state.  The city had concentrated in manufacturing (although 
this was over by 1980) and had extremely high local tax levels.  Together these factors 
drove Boston’s decline.  By 1980, Boston was just another of America’s formerly great 
declining cities.  Its real estate values were low and it had lost population steadily since 
1950.  The city was beginning to suffer from the social problems, such as high poverty 
and unemployment, that generally accompany urban decline.  Indeed, an urban observer 
looking at Boston in 1980 would have every reason to believe that it would go the way of 
Detroit and Syracuse and continue along its sad path towards urban irrelevance. 
 
V.  1980-2000: America’s Athens Turns Commercial 
 
But that didn’t happen.  During the past 20 years, the Boston metropolitan area has 
gained population steadily.  The city of Boston hasn’t grown significantly more populous, 
but at least the population drain has stopped.  Most dramatically, there has been an 
explosion of housing values.  These values create urban problems of their own, but they 
are a strong indication of demand for that particular city.  While Detroit and Syracuse are 
still places marked by extremely low housing demand, the Boston market has generally 
been extremely hot.  Moreover, Boston has been linked to a number of the most 
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explore the reasons for Boston’s success in the 1980-2000 period. 
 
One of the most persistent predictors of urban growth over the last century is the skill 
level of a city (Simon and Nardinelli, 2002, Glaeser et al., 1995).  Figure 11 shows the 
relationship between percent college educated in 1980 and the population growth over the 
next 20 years among the 147 metropolitan areas with more than 100,000 residents in 
1980 with mean January temperatures below 40 degrees.  Among these colder cities, 
skills are the best predictor of growth.  The correlation coefficient between share of 
college graduates in 1980 and growth between 1980 and 2000 is 54 percent in this 
sample.  The correlation coefficient in the full sample of metropolitan areas with more 
than 100,000 people is 29 percent.  The line in the figure tells us that as the share of the 
population (over 25 years old) with college degrees rises by one percent, the growth rate 
between 1980 and 2000 rose by 1.9 percent.   
 
At this point, it is not clear why high human capital areas do well and low human capital 
areas do more poorly.  One set of theories focuses on the role of skilled workers are 
innovators and entrepreneurs.  An alternative set of theories focuses on the importance of 
a skilled labor force and argues that firms are moving to places with skilled labor forces.  
Alternatively, skilled workers may be particularly important in providing locational 
amenities.  Poverty and social problems go together and it may well be that the poor 
growth record of low skill cities actually reflects the social problems that accompany low 
levels of skill.  A final theory is that skilled workers have specialized in industries that 
have done well over the last 50 years.   
 
Boston is, of course, hardly the most educated metropolitan area in the country or even 
the most educated of the larger metropolitan areas.  In 2000, Boulder, Colorado was the 
metropolitan area with the highest share of college graduates amongst its adult 
population.  Indeed not only Boulder but also the metropolitan areas of Madison, 
Wisconsin, San Francisco, San Jose, Stamford, Connecticut and Washington, D.C. all 
have a higher share of college graduates than Boston.  Still, out of the set of 209 
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statistical area had the sixth highest level of college graduates in 2000.
4   39.5 percent of 
Boston’s population over the age of 25 had a college degree and 51.2 percent of 
Bostonians between the ages of 25 and 34 had that much education.  This extremely high 
level of education predicts that Boston should have done well over the past 20 years, and 
indeed it did. 
 
How was education the engine of Boston’s success?  Table 1 displays the top industries 
in Suffolk, Middesex and Norfolk counties.  This data comes from the 2001 edition of 
County Business Patterns, is based on establishment level questionnaires, and omits 
workers in sufficiently small businesses and government employment.
5  I have used the 
North American Industry Classification System codes and reported employment by 3-
digit “NAICS” code.  Together the top ten industries account for 63, 57 and 46 percent of 
employment in Suffolk, Middlesex and Norfolk counties respectively.  The first fact to 
take away from these tables is that while Middlesex county has 110 percent more people 
than Suffolk county, it only has 50 percent more employees.  Thus, while it is certainly 
true that employment within the Boston metropolitan area has decentralized, it also 
remains true that there is more employment at the center than at the periphery. 
 
The tables make it clear that Boston is dominated by four export industries: professional 
services, education, finance and healthcare.  Professional services is a big category that 
means different things in Middlesex and Suffolk counties.  In Middlesex county, 
professional services are primarily computer-related services (with 38,679 employees) 
and scientific research and development services (with 20,016 employees).  These two 
four digit SIC code industries account for 53 percent of professional services in 
Middlesex and six percent of total employment in the county.  In Middlesex county, 
therefore, professional services means high technology.  In Suffolk, however, the 
professional services are dominated by law firms who employ 17,908 people in that 
county.  Suffolk county also has 9,217 people working at computer-related consulting 
                                                 
4 In this case, I have included all primary metropolitan statistical areas.   
5 Some industries with small numbers of employers are suppressed, so there is some potential for error.   
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traditional downtown county with a focus on law and management consulting, while 
Middlesex county is dominated by the technology sector.  This dominance can also be 
seen by the fact that Middlesex county is the only one of the three counties with a 
significant manufacturing industry: computer and electronic machinery manufacturing. 
 
It is also obviously true that if Boston is not the Athens of America, it is still remarkably 
oriented towards education.  Educational services is the second largest industry in 
Middlesex county and the fourth largest industry in Suffolk county.  These numbers are 
dominated by higher education, since public school employees are excluded from County 
Business Patterns.  In a sense, Boston’s specialization in education is actually more 
remarkable than its specialization in professional services.  After all, professional 
services are a large sector of the U.S. economy as a whole.  Across the nation, 6.2 percent 
of employees in County Business patterns are in the professional services industry, which 
tells us that Boston workers are about twice as likely to be in those industries as workers 
elsewhere.  But only 2.3 percent of County Business Pattern workers are employed by 
educational service firms in the country as a whole.  As a result, workers in Middlesex 
county are more than three times more likely to be in education than workers elsewhere 
in the U.S.  Boston’s dominance in higher education has existed for centuries and in an 
era when college and post-graduate education became increasingly valuable, it is not 
surprising that Boston’s schools did well.   
 
Health care is another large Boston industry, especially in Suffolk County where 
hospitals and ambulatory health care together account for 14 percent of the total 
employees in County Business Patterns.  These two three digit industries account for six 
percent of employment in Middlesex County and eight percent of employment in Norfolk 
County.  These numbers are not that unusual.  Nationwide, 8.5 percent of County 
Business Patterns employees are in these two industries.  Suffolk County is unusually 
dependent on this industry, but they are a big component of employment in the other 
counties because they are a large component of employment in most places. 
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in financial services.  Nine percent of Suffolk County employment is in securities and 
commodity contracts and four percent is in financial intermediation.   Like New York, 
Boston developed expertise in finance because of the early connection between finance 
and shipping.  This connection occurred both because shipping required risk-sharing and 
complicated commodity trading, and because shipping generated profits that were then 
reinvested.  Like New York, finance remains important long after the maritime trades 
have lost their relevance.    
 
The remaining top industries are usually big and generally cater to local residents.  They 
are not themselves either a source of external revenues or economic growth.  Indeed, 
health care is itself correlated with urban decline (at least over the past decade) not urban 
growth, so the keys to Boston’s growth have been (and will continue to be) technology, 
finance and education.  These industries are the flip side of Boston’s high education level.  
Boston’s high level of education is important because it is connected to specialization in 
these three industries.  Skilled workers are needed in these industries and the presence of 
skilled workers led to entrepreneurship in both technology and professional services.   
  
With this I can return to the comparison between Boston and the rust belt cities.  Like 
Syracuse and Detroit, Boston was a cold, manufacturing city that had done poorly over 
the 1950-1980 period.  But unlike those cities, Boston had universities, a well educated 
workforce and a residual finance industry.  In the 1980s, the return to schooling 
skyrocketed.  The computer revolution sped up and demand for education soared.  As a 
result, Boston did extremely well.  The other manufacturing cities of the northeast had 
much lower levels of education and, as a result, little presence in technology.  In 1950, 
Boston’s universities may have seemed like a quaint anachronism of the city’s Brahmin 
past.  However, those universities meant that when America became an information 
economy, Boston would be able to capitalize on that transformation. 
 
The Forms of Boston’s Success 
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success, but at this point it is worth asking what form that success has taken and why 
Boston has changed in the way that it has changed.  First, the Boston area has become 
more populous.  The Boston consolidated metropolitan statistical area has grown by 13.5 
percent over the past two decades.  This is certainly impressive, but the median 
metropolitan area with more than 200,000 people grew by 22 percent and the total U.S. 
population grew by 24 percent.  Inner Boston population growth was even more modest.   
The city of Boston grew by 4.3 percent over those two decades and the city of Cambridge 
grew by 6.3 percent. Admittedly this growth was better than the decline of the 1950-1980 
period, but Boston’s success—if it exists—must show up elsewhere. 
 
Conventionally, there are three ways of measuring urban success: population growth, 
income growth and housing price growth.  All three measures have advantages and 
problems.  Increasing productivity in a city will show up in increasing wages, prices and 
population.   In principle, increasing “demand” for a city, by which I mean an increasing 
desire of people to live in a particular area, will show up in increasing population and 
increasing housing prices.  As such, it is worthwhile asking what has happened to wages 
and housing in the Boston area to examine these other measures of urban success. 
 
Wages in the Boston area have certainly increased.  In 1980, Boston’s income ranked it 
in the second quartile of metropolitan statistical areas with more than 200,000 people.  In 
other words, about one-quarter of larger metropolitan areas had higher income levels than 
Boston.  Bostonians earned somewhat less than the residents of Atlanta and somewhat 
more than the residents of Pittsburgh.  Today, the Boston consolidated metropolitan 
area’s median household income ranks fourth among consolidated metropolitan areas 
behind Minneapolis, San Francisco and Washington, D.C.  Boston’s per capita income 
ranks fifth behind those three areas and West Palm Beach.  While Boston’s population 
growth has not been extraordinary, its income growth has been extremely impressive and 
now Boston is among the richest places in the country. 
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Because of the considerable variables across cities within the Boston area, it makes sense 
to focus on housing prices at the city, not metropolitan area, level.  Across 541 cities in 
the U.S. in 1980 with more than 25,000 residents, by median housing value growth, 
Boston ranks fourth.  Newton ranks third.  Somerville ranks fifth and Cambridge ranks 
first.  The average housing price growth in this sample is 147 percent over these two 
decades.  The median housing price in Somerville increased by 393 percent.  The median 
housing price in Boston increased by 429 percent and the median housing price in 
Newton increased by 439 percent.  Most incredibly, the median housing price in 
Cambridge increased by 549 percent.  These numbers are incredible, but they capture 
reality: Boston has boomed over the past 20 years but this boom has been reflected 
mostly in higher housing prices, not in larger population levels. 
 
Why does a booming Texas economy lead to more bodies and little change in housing 
prices, but a booming Massachusetts economy lead only to massive increases in the price 
of housing?  Standard economic reasoning tells us that the key determinant of whether 
prices or population rises is the elasticity of housing supply.  When housing is elastically 
supplied, we should expect there to be little change in price and a large increase in 
bodies.  When housing is inelastically supplied, then a local boom causes prices to rise 
and little change in total population. The most natural explanation of the form of 
Boston’s success is that housing supply has been extremely inelastic, especially in the 
cities close to downtown Boston. 
 
There are several reasons for this inelasticity.  Boston’s traditionally high densities are 
also partially to blame.  Furthermore, housing supply is completely inelastic when 
housing prices are below construction costs and indeed for much of the 1980-2000 period 
(but not today) housing prices were still too low for builders to actually want to build (see 
Glaeser and Gyourko, 2002, for details).  Finally, zoning and other constraints on new 
construction can lead to major constraints on new development.  These constraints mean 
that if a city becomes more attractive, prices rise, but there are only very tiny amounts of 
new construction. 
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To make this point clearly, I now compare Massachusetts and Texas over the 1980-2000 
period.  I chose Texas because it has some of the fewest constraints on development 
anywhere in the U.S.  In 2002 alone, Texas handed out 160,530 construction permits.  In 
that year, Massachusetts gave out 16,875 permits.  The sunbelt has other states that are 
similar to Texas (Nevada, Arizona, etc.), but Texas seems like a good example of a state 
with few barriers to new construction.   
 
Figures 12 and 13 shows the impact of initial years of education on urban success in 
Texas over the 1980-2000 period.  I use city-level observations and in Figure 12 I show 
the relationship between city population growth and the initial share of the adult 
education with college degrees.  As I argued earlier, college education is associated with 
urban success and this is as true in Texas as anywhere else.  Figure 12 shows a 39 percent 
correlation between city growth and the share of the population with college degrees.  
The line in the graph tells us that if the share of the city’s population with college degrees 
rises by one percent, the expected growth rate over the period rises by 1.2 percent.  
Figure 13 shows the relationship between education and housing price growth in Texas—
there is none.  The relationship between the two variables is weakly negative and not 
statistically significant from zero.  Skills predict population growth but not housing price 
growth in Texas.  New homes are built and people are able to move into cities that are 
growing. 
 
Figures 14 and 15 show the same relationships for Massachusetts.  Figure 14 shows the 
connection between initial years of schooling and later population growth across 
Massachusetts cities.  In this case, initial schooling has no impact on later population 
growth.  Figure 15 shows that this lack of impact does not mean that schooling fails to 
predict urban success in Massachusetts.  Initial schooling has an extraordinary positive 
effect on housing price growth in Massachusetts over the 1980-2000 period.  The 
correlation coefficient between these two variables is 78 percent.  As share of the initial 
population with college degrees rises by one percent, expected housing price growth rises 
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success means more bodies. 
 
Together these set of graphs suggest that the regulatory environment strongly influences 
the path of urban growth.  In Texas, which is one extreme, successful cities grow in 
population.  In Boston, which has a much more restrictive regulatory environment, urban 
success has led to higher prices, but not more people.  
 
At this point, it is hard to say how costly the regulation of new construction in 
Massachusetts may be.  Indeed, it may be that the benefits of preserving low density 
living outweigh the costs of artificially forcing people to stay away from Boston, and the 
costs of forcing employers to pay more for workers.  Further work must address this 
issue.  In 1980, dealing with urban success did not seem to be Boston’s most pressing 
problem, but in 2000, we are lucky enough to be challenged with figuring out the right 
way to grow. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Boston has had an extraordinary history and it has had four different eras of success, each 
driven by a slightly different force.  For the first 100 years of its existence, it was 
America’s premier city.  Boston was the capital of America’s most commercially diverse 
region and it served as the central port for that region.  In the 1750-1800 period, Boston 
had its first era of decline as its port was eclipsed by New York and Philadelphia.  Those 
cities’ more southern locations and superior rivers made them vastly superior places for 
shipping goods into and out of America. 
 
But in the first 40 years of the 19
th century, Boston had its first recovery.  Peace and the 
increasing globalization of the 19
th century maritime economy enabled Boston seafarers 
to exploit their expertise.  New York and Philadelphia were still the dominant points of 
entry in the U.S., but Boston based seafarers manned ships owned by Boston merchants, 
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trade and the whaling industry.   
 
Just as the steamship eliminated Boston’s supremacy in sailing ships, Boston reinvented 
itself once again as a manufacturing city.  Because of the unusual temporal coincidence 
of the Irish potato famine and the last period of Bostonian maritime dominance, a vast 
number of Irish immigrants came to Massachusetts because Boston was the cheapest and 
closest port of entry.  These immigrants would provide the muscle for industrial growth 
of what had been a maritime time.  Boston’s nineteenth century industrial growth was 
abetted by railroads and by the fact that factories used steam, not water, for power.  
Indeed, almost every large northern city in the U.S. as of 1860 became an industrial 
powerhouse over the next 60 years as factories started in central locations where they 
could save transport costs and make use of large urban labor forces. 
 
But this period of growth came to an end in 1920.  During the middle years of the 20
th 
century, urban growth was driven by the move to sun and sprawl.  As Boston was a high 
density city in a cold state, it was bound to decline.  Bostonian streets were built around 
the pedestrian and the streetcar and, unsurprisingly, people left for the edges of the 
metropolitan area.  Moreover, technological improvements meant that warmer climes 
became increasingly attractive and people moved south and west.  As of 1980, Boston 
resembled many of the industrial hulks dotting the northeast and Midwest.  A reasonable 
guess was that Boston’s path between 1980 and 2000 would resemble the path that was 
actually taken by Detroit. 
 
In the 1980-2000 period, Boston turned out to look more like San Jose than like Detroit.  
The booming information economy relied on skilled workers and Boston’s long history 
had left the city with a surfeit of universities.  As a result, Boston was ideally poised to 
take advantage of the rise in returns to skill that so marked the last quarter of the 
twentieth century.  Boston left manufacturing and specialized in high technology, finance 
and education—industries that required skilled workers and that did extremely well over 
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Boston will continue to thrive. 
 
Still, Boston’s success leaves us with a major policy quandary.  In the less regulated areas 
of the sunbelt, local economic success leads to massive new construction, accompanying 
large increases in population and small changes in housing prices.  In the regulated 
Massachusetts economy, new construction is extremely difficult and as a result, 
economic success leads to higher prices, not large numbers of new homes.  As a result, 
Boston faces extraordinarily high housing prices.  Boston’s limits on new construction 
were relatively costless in an era of urban decline, but as the area thrives, these barriers to 
construction pose the largest barrier to new growth and may well create large social costs 
for Bostonians and would-be Bostonians.  The regulation on new construction is surely 
the most important policy area facing Boston today.    
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Table 1: Population Growth of the Ten Largest American Cities in 1860 
City  Population in 1860  Population in 1920  Growth Rate 
New York  813,669  5,620,048  590% 
Philadelphia 565,529  1,823,779  222% 
Brooklyn* 266,661  2,300,664  763% 
Baltimore  212,418 733,826 245% 
Boston  177,840 748,060 320% 
New  Orleans  168,675 387,219 129% 
Cincinnati  161,044 401,247 149% 
St.  Louis  160,773 772,897 380% 
Chicago 112,172 2,701,705  2,308% 
Buffalo 81,129  506,775 525% 
 *The population for Brooklyn in 1920 is the population of Kings County. 
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Figure 1: Boston's Population 1790-2000
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Figure 2: Boston's Share of Total U.S. Population
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  50Figure 5: Population of Boston Counties
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  51Figure 6: Boston Counties as a Share of the U.S.
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  52Figure 7: Temperature and State Growth 1920-1980
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  53Figure 8: Density and City Growth 1920-1980
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  54Figure 9: Manufacturing and Urban Decline
Manufacturing Employment Share
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Figure 10: Taxes and City Growth 1920-1980
City Taxes/Income 1980
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Figure 11: MSA Growth and Education 1980-2000
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Figure 12: City Growth and Schooling in Texas
Share w /College Degrees 1980
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Figure 13: Price Growth and Schooling in Texas
Share w /College Degrees 1980
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Figure 14: City Growth and Schooling in Mass.
Share w /College Degrees 1980
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Figure 15: Price Growth and Schooling in Mass.
Share w /College Degrees 1980
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